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December 2, 2002 
This is comparable to Pearl Harbor and we must have the same response, and the people who 
did it must have the same end, as the people who attacked Pearl Harbor. 
- Henry Kissinger, interviewed on CNN, 11 September 2001 
There were still no words to express the emotions pent up in the silent people listening to the 
radios, reading the papers, taking the trains The war we face is different from any war we have 
ever known. Our peril is far greater than before, but we will win with the full strength of 
America. 
- Time magazine editorial, 15 December 1941 
The world was on fire. Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland—gone. France, a Great Power by any reckoning 
eighteen months before, had been crushed by German armies in a matter of weeks. The Balkans and 
North Africa were ablaze. Much of China had been overrun by Japan in a war of stark barbarity that was 
four years old, and showed no signs of abating. Britain, assailed from the air and beset by sea, hung by a 
thread. The Mediterranean was impassable. In Central Asia ten million Soviet and German soldiers were 
locked in annihilatory combat along a thousand-mile front. It was on such a Sunday afternoon that my 
mother walked downstairs to my father's shop and said, "Honey, I just heard on the radio that the Japs 
have bombed Pearl Harbor." And then, my dad told me, he put down his tools and said, "There's going to 
be trouble." 
Infamy 
I love this story, though my father doesn't understand why I think it is so funny. The next day, when 
President Roosevelt declared December 7, 1941 "a date that will live in infamy," he knew what the 
president meant. Yet Dad's reaction had been different: outrage, certainly, but mostly sheer aggravation. 
My father meant no one any harm. It was just incomprehensible to him that anybody would deliberately—
deliberately—attack America. It made no sense. I'm one hundred percent sure that, in the entire course of 
the Second World War, it never occurred to him that the United States might lose. But still, it was trouble 
for nothing. Life would not now go on as expected, everyone would suffer, and for no good reason. 
The president offered no help with this problem. His advisors had urged him to prepare a lengthy speech, 
laying out the history of Japanese aggression in Asia over the previous ten years, by way of explaining 
the declaration of war he was asking from Congress. But the president, a man of acute political instincts, 
knew better. The thing spoke for itself, and he wasn't going to blur the image of those ships in flames with 
a lot of botanizing about Manchuria. Like a number of his successors, Roosevelt felt called upon to 
characterize those who had attacked the strongest country on earth as cowards ("dastardly attack"), but 
the key word in his message to congress was obviously "unprovoked." A recent survey by the National 
Geographic Society has revealed that fifty-eight percent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-four cannot find Japan on a map. I'd be willing to bet a whole lot more than that know that Pearl 
Harbor (wherever that is!) was a "sneak attack." Whatever came next, that was on the other guy. You 
asked for it. You got it. 
Was Franklin Roosevelt surprised by Pearl Harbor? The answer is surely "Yes," though the shock was 
tempered by a sense of relief. For him, life had just gotten a lot simpler. He was not convinced that 
American economic pressure, which had become severe following the imposition of an oil embargo and 
the freezing of Japanese assets in July, would deter Tokyo from exploiting German success in order to 
seize European colonies in Asia. He had been worried for months that the Japanese would attack the 
outposts of the British Empire in Southeast Asia while by-passing American positions in the Pacific, 
confronting him with the need to come to the aid of a vital ally without the moral leverage afforded by 
having suffered a direct attack. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, public opinion polls showed Americans evenly 
divided on the question of intervening in Europe, even if failing to do so meant the Nazis would win the 
war. A large majority believed that, even in the wake of an American victory, they would have to work 
harder for less money, pay higher prices, and suffer higher unemployment. These apprehensions, along 
with what was left of Congressional isolationism, crumbled under the weight of the Japanese attack—
though there was one House vote against war even so. 
Still, despite months of thinking about it and getting ready for it, the president found it hard to accept that 
something so readily and frequently foreseen had actually occurred. Six days earlier, he had told his most 
intimate advisor, Harry Hopkins, that Japanese expansion into Indochina "[meant] war." To this Hopkins 
had responded that "it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise"; 
a suggestion Roosevelt rejected on the grounds that "we are a democracy and a peaceful people." What 
meaning does "surprise" have for someone whose working life was full of such conversations? Logically? 
Hard to say. But emotionally the blow was terrible, the more so, perhaps, because the hopes thus torn to 
shreds were already so thread-bare. One cabinet secretary who saw the president on the night of 
December 7th reported that he had "actual physical difficulty in getting out the words that put him on 
record as knowing that the Navy was caught unawares." 
Ready? 
The Pacific war was unlike any America had fought up to then (or since), not least because we had been 
planning to fight it for forty years—the only occasion on which the United States has entered a war so 
well-prepared intellectually. In Europe, everything had to be extemporized. Even the question of where 
(and whether) to send in the Army had to be worked out from first principles after the shooting started. At 
the Naval War College, however, no island had gone un-hopped in war games calculated to determine 
how best to bring the American fleet into contact with its Japanese adversary, code-named "Orange" by 
the Joint Army-Navy Board responsible for war planning. The conflict that followed did not conform, 
except in the most general way, to any of the two dozen or so major Pacific war plans generated since 
the conquest of the Philippines in 1898. But it was the mental exercise that mattered, the constant 
resifting of facts, rechecking of assumptions. Afterwards Admiral Chester Nimitz, who commanded U.S. 
forces in the Central Pacific, said that nothing really unexpected had happened during the whole war. It 
had all been worked out and thought through in advance. Nothing, that is, after the first day or so. When 
the U.S.S. Enterprise steamed into the desolation of Pearl Harbor twenty-four hours after the Japanese 
had left, its sailors were hard at work tearing up and throwing overboard the thick, highly combustible 
linoleum that had been used to cover its decks. Suddenly, fire had become an issue. 
History can shed remarkably little light on such disconcerting moments, except to reveal that they happen 
all the time. The cognitive gap between peace and war is enormous, and no form of preparation or 
training seems fully able to bridge it. The experience of lethal violence, of mortal danger, grief, and terror, 
cannot be simulated, and learning from other peoples' experiences, well, it's just not that easy. When I 
teach my naval strategy course I usually mention that one reason the Russian fleet lost its great battle 
with the Japanese at Tsushima in 1905 was that the paint on its ships was flammable. The Japanese 
lacked armor-piercing ammunition, but their shells, bursting on hull surfaces, set superstructures ablaze, 
killing the crews and rendering gun turrets inoperable. Students mostly react to this little factoid with give-
me-a-break bemusement: what could you expect from Rasputin's navy, after all? But then when they find 
out about the linoleum on the American carriers, the response turns to one of annoyance: had people 
back then not learned "the 
lessons of the past"? Which lesson would that be, exactly? Do smart things? Don't do stupid things? 
All Ships Sortie 
One historian has calculated that, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy had accumulated 
fifty-six hours of combat time in its entire history. Four years later it had become one of the most 
successful and thoroughly battle-tested naval forces that has ever existed. Also, by far, the largest. Over 
the course of the Second World War total Naval tonnage afloat increased by six hundred percent. 
Between 1940 and 1945 the United States constructed over twelve hundred major combatant warships, 
along with tens of thousands of auxiliary craft of every description. Eighty-four thousand of these were 
landing craft, a type of vessel that did not exist when Pearl Harbor was struck—think how different the 
war might have been had the Japanese possessed them—and one whose tactical application cut against 
the grain of two generations of navalist thinking, which had identified fleet combat as the universal solvent 
of sea power. Not all naval construction was so perspicacious. The United States also built ten battleships 
during the war, whose tonnage rivaled that of the landing craft. These might as well have been dispensed 
with. But such wasted motion is always part of war, and in the end it made no difference. What mattered 
was to build more of everything. The best strategy, after all, is to be strong everywhere. 
Such prodigies were possible because of the organizing power of violence in war, in which the entropic 
effects of friction and chance are partially offset by the gravitational pull created by a readily apparent 
common purpose. When all else fails, one rarely goes far wrong by marching toward the sound of the 
guns. The Navy knew what to do about Japan long before Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval building authorized 
during 1940 alone outstripped a decade of Japanese construction; a fact that, by the usual perversities of 
strategic calculation, actually helped to precipitate the attack. Tokyo knew that in a matter of a few years it 
would stand no chance at all against the U.S. in the Pacific. They knew it. We knew it. More than that, we 
counted on the fact that they knew it to deter them from attacking us. Do smart things. Don't do stupid 
things. 
The sense of having been played for a fool was most definitely part of the emotional mix after Pearl 
Harbor, as it was following the al-Qaeda attacks last year, which brought allusions to 1941 briefly to the 
surface of policy chatter. It was the only other time anybody could think of when Americans had so 
complacently leaned into such a ferocious sucker punch. Strategically, of course, the analogy has nothing 
whatever to recommend it, which is presumably why it has faded from view. Psychologically, too, the 
thing is all wrong, which is more interesting. "Pearl Harbor" stands for a call to arms—for everyone putting 
down their tools and tending to the trouble. Nothing remotely like that has followed the advent of the "war 
on terror," an expression one feels compelled to place within quotation marks not to disown it, but 
because its meaning is so plainly metaphorical: more like the war on drugs, on poverty, on cancer, than 
the war against Japan. Setting aside the fact that nobody knows what a mass mobilization against 
terrorism would entail, such a thing, were it to happen, would be widely (and reasonably) regarded as a 
victory for terrorism in itself. In the immediate wake of the September 11 attacks, when all American 
hearts beat as one, and half the teenagers in the country were setting aside their dreams of making the 
NBA in order to become fire-fighters, the President of the United States went on television to urge 
everyone to step up to this new challenge and—do what? Get on an airplane. Buy some stock. Love thy 
neighbor. The battle cry for the war on terror is not "Damn the Torpedoes" but "Business as Usual." 
Anything else would give aid and comfort to the enemy. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
  
 
